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CONTROLLING BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS:
HOW THE JAPANESE STANDARD FOR PATENTING
SOFTWARE COULD BRING REASONABLE
LIMITATIONS TO BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
James S. Sfekas†
Abstract: In recent years, the United States has expanded the scope of subject
matter that can be patented. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has evolved a
standard that allows inventors to patent software as long as it produces a useful and
tangible result. Japan has also expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, but in a
more limited fashion. Under the Japanese standard, the Japan Patent Office will only
grant a patent to software inventions that apply a law of nature. The U.S. standard is too
generous in allowing patents on software and business methods. Business method
patents, in particular, are problematic because they are not consistent with the goals of
patents and because they stray from the focus on granting patents to technology.
Software patents, however, should not be overly limited because software is an area of
technology and because software patents provide value to innovative parts of the
economy. The United States should change its standard for determining whether an
invention claims patentable subject matter by incorporating the Japanese standard. Under
this standard, software inventions that control an apparatus or that work based on
physical properties are considered patentable subject matter. Software inventions that do
not meet this requirement will only be considered patentable subject matter if they show
information processing performed by software as it is implemented in hardware. This
standard would put limits on business method patents, including requiring that they be
technological, while not overly limiting useful software patents.
In addition,
incorporating the Japanese standard would help the cause of patent law harmonization.
Patentability of software has been a stumbling block for negotiations to harmonize patent
law world-wide, but unilateral action in this area would improve the chances of countries
agreeing to substantive patent law harmonization.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Business methods have historically been excluded from patenting in
all countries. However, recently that situation has changed in the United
States. After the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.1 that business
methods were not excluded from patenting, the number of applications for
business method patents received by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

†
The author would like to thank Professor Toshiko Takenaka, Deborah Huang, and the editors of
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their help in the development of this comment.
1
149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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(“USPTO”) increased from very few in 1997 to almost 8,000 in 2000.2
Many commentators in the mass media argue that this has led to a broken
patent system that grants patents for trivial inventions.3
A proposed definition of business methods defines one as “a method
of . . . administering, managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise
. . . including a technique used in . . . conducting business; or processing
financial data.”4 The definition also includes techniques used in athletics,
instruction or personal skill.5 There is some overlap between business
method patents and software patents, because business method inventions
are frequently implemented in software. However, software patents cover a
wide range of inventions that are not considered business methods. Because
of the close connection between the two areas, any discussion of business
method patents must consider the general category of software patents as
well.
Critics of business method patents argue that they are unnecessary and
that allowing them has led to an increased number of “bad” patents—patents
that should never have been granted by the patent office.6 Many also argue
that business method patents should not be allowed because they are abstract
ideas rather than concrete inventions.7 These same arguments have played
out in Europe and Japan as well.8 Over the past two decades, national patent
offices in those countries have changed and broadened the standards for
what software and business methods may be patented.9 Since the
government grants a patent monopoly in order to encourage innovation in
technology,10 it is important to ensure that this monopoly is serving its
purpose with business method patents.
This comment argues that the United States should adopt the Japanese
standard for determining whether a software or business method invention is
2

Bradley D. Lytle and John Dellinger, Business Method Boot Camp: What Every IP Attorney
Should Know About Business Method Patents, http://www.oblon.com/media/index.php?id=50 (last visited
May 9, 2006).
3
See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Blackberry Lawsuit is Patently Absurd, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 26,
2006, at D01; Eric Chabrow, Patently Absurd – The U.S. Patent System Is in Disarray. Change Requires
Not Just a Better System, But Better Patents, Too., INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 20, 2006, at 36.
4
H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. § 2 (2001).
5
Id.
6
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Essay: Are Business Methods Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268 (May 2000).
7
Id. at 266.
8
See generally Hideo Furutani, Patentability of Business Method Inventions in Japan Compared
With
the
U.S.
and
Europe
2-8
(2003),
http://www.furutani.co.jp/office/
ronbun/Business_method_patents_in_Japan.pdf (last visited October 20, 2006) (discussing the evolution of
standards for patenting business methods in the United States, Japan and Europe).
9
Id.
10
See infra Part II.
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patentable subject matter. The Japanese standard limits business method
patents while still allowing patents on software. In addition, changing the
U.S. standard would be a step toward eliminating one of the biggest
obstacles to patent law harmonization. Part II provides a general
background on common features of patent systems worldwide and describes
essential concepts for understanding the contrasting standards. Part III
explains the U.S. standard for patenting software and business methods and
how it developed. Part IV explains the Japanese standard for patenting
software and business methods. Part V describes the advantages of software
patents and objections to business method patents. Part VI proposes that the
United States should incorporate the elements of the Japanese standard for
determining whether a software invention is patentable subject matter,
because the proposed standard would limit business method patents while
retaining most of the advantages of software patents. Part VII discusses how
this change would also support efforts to harmonize world patent laws.
II.

THE PATENT SYSTEM REPRESENTS A GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED
MONOPOLY TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATION

The patent system is unusual in that it is a government-sanctioned
monopoly.11 Patents were originally royal grants of monopoly in a particular
area12 but were outlawed by the Statute of Monopolies, except in the case of
patent monopolies given to the “first and true inventor” of a “new
manufacture.”13 The patent monopoly was acceptable because the cost of
granting the right was balanced by the inventive contribution.14 The
monopoly was intended to ensure that inventors would be able to enjoy the
economic benefits of their efforts15 and to provide an incentive for inventors
to share their inventions with the public.16 Patents were once justified as
protecting a creator’s moral right to his invention17 and as a reward for
creating a useful invention,18 but those views have fallen into disfavor. 19

11
FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks & Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at III (1958).
12
Id. at 2.
13
Id. at 2-3.
14
Id. at III.
15
Id. at 19.
16
Id. at 21.
17
Id. at 22-23 (discussing the 1791 French patent law, which declared that inventors had a natural
property right to their inventions).
18
Id. at 29.
19
See id. at 25-26.
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In the United States, patents are authorized by Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to grant monopolies on
“discoveries” in order “[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.”20 This has generally been interpreted to mean that patent protection
can only be granted in the areas of “applied technology.”21 Other countries
have similar minimum requirements.22
If the patent examiner finds that the invention is patentable subject
matter, he must then evaluate whether it meets the utility requirement.
Under U.S. law, this means an inventor cannot get a patent for an invention
without knowing what it can be used for.23 In Japan, this is stated as a
requirement that the invention must be “industrially applicable.”24
In addition to being useful, an invention must be both novel25 and
nonobvious.26 An invention is novel if there is no single piece of “prior art,”
such as a patent or prior publication, that describes or anticipates that
invention.27 In the United States, an invention is unpatentable under the
nonobviousness requirement if a person having ordinary skill in the art could
have created it by combining elements from the prior art.28 Similarly, Japan
requires that an invention have an “inventive step,”29 which means that a
patent cannot be granted for an invention which a person having ordinary
skill in the art could have invented based on known prior art.30
Every patent application contains a specification, which must present
sufficient information such that a person having ordinary skill in the art
could recognize that the inventor has invented what is being claimed.31 The
specification must also disclose sufficient information so that one skilled in
the art could make the invention.32 Every application must include “claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.01 (2005). In this context, “applied technology” is
used in contrast to “science.” So, patents are not intended to protect knowledge per se, but the application
of that knowledge in useful ways. Id. n.12.
22
See, e.g., Japanese Patent Office Examination Guidelines, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-3 [hereinafter
JPO Examination Guidelines], available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/1312-002_e.htm
(listing types of inventions that are not patentable).
23
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
24
Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.
25
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
26
Id. § 103.
27
Id. § 102, Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.
28
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
29
Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(2).
30
ZENTARO KITAGAWA, 3-VI-2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 2.02[3] (2005).
31
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
32
Gould v. Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383, 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
21
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applicant regards as his invention.”33 The claims “define the metes and
bounds of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
invention,”34 although the specification may be used as an aid to interpreting
the claims.35
THE UNITED STATES HAS STRUGGLED TO DEAL WITH BUSINESS
METHOD PATENTS

III.

The standard for patenting business methods has a long history. Many
business method patents in recent years have been for business methods
implemented in software on a general-purpose computer.36 Because of this,
the standard for determining patentability of software inventions is closely
linked to the standard for patenting business methods.
The history of business method patents in the United States began
with Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.,37 in which the court noted
that “[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not . . . an art.”38 This case was the basis for what
became known as the “business method exception,” which stated that
business methods are automatically unpatentable abstract ideas.39
The distinction between technical processes and business methods
started to blur with the spread of computers, as inventors started to push the
boundaries of patentable subject matter.40 The Supreme Court first
attempted to clarify these boundaries in Gottschalk v. Benson,41 where it
considered the question of whether software was patentable. The Court held
that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.”42 Instead, the Court said that patenteligible subject matter resulted “from the application of the law of nature to
produce a new and useful result.”43
33

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
Hilton-Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
35
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36
This is true of many of the most controversial business method patents, such as Priceline’s reverse
auction patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sep. 4, 1996) and Amazon.com’s 1-click patent, U.S.
Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sep. 12, 1997).
37
160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
38
Id. at 469. The patent was actually found invalid based on other criteria. Id. at 472.
39
See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting); State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass. 1996).
40
CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[5].
41
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
42
Id. at 67.
43
Id., quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
34
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This ruling was supplemented in Parker v. Flook.44 The Court held
that while including a law of nature or mathematical algorithm did not
automatically disqualify patentability,45 an invention had to include “some
other inventive concept in its application” in order to be patentable.46 The
USPTO interpreted Flook to bar any computer-related inventions from
patentability and rejected all applications for patents on such inventions.47
However, the Supreme Court soon contradicted this interpretation in
Diamond v. Diehr,48 holding that a process for curing rubber did not become
unpatentable just because one part was controlled by a computer.49 The
Court first noted that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are specifically denied patentability.50 However, the Court then held
that “an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”51 After
Diehr, the question became whether the formula described in the claim was
part of a structure or process that “when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing . . . .”52
At about the same time the Supreme Court ruled on Diehr, the Court
significantly broadened the scope of patentable subject matter for
biotechnology inventions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.53 In allowing the
applicant to patent a type of bacteria, the Court said, “In choosing such
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by
the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws
would be given wide scope.”54 The Court then noted that “Congress
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is
made by man.’”55
In the years after Flook and Diehr, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit developed the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to limit the
patentability of software inventions.56 However, in the 1990s, momentum
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 594.
CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[6][f].
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 192.
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[6][i].
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started to build in favor of relaxing the standards for patentable subject
matter.57 In In re Alappat,58 the Federal Circuit held that an invention would
not be eliminated from patentability just because the claim “would read on a
general-purpose computer programmed to carry out the invention.”59
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,60
the Federal Circuit completely eliminated the mathematical algorithm and
business method exceptions. The court held that mathematical algorithms
were excluded from patentability only insofar as they were abstract ideas,
but they were not inherently excluded.61 The court then held that an
algorithm was patentable if it was used to create a “useful, concrete and
tangible result.”62 Finally, the court eliminated the business method
exception, noting that there was no statutory or caselaw support for it.63 A
year later, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,64 the court
broadened the State Street holding to include process claims, in addition to
machine claims of the type at issue in State Street.65
Unsurprisingly, the number of business method patent applications
increased significantly in the years immediately following State Street and
AT&T Corp. While previously there had been few business method patent
applications, the USPTO received 2,821 applications in 1999.66 The
following year, that number rose to 7,800.67 The USPTO has implemented a
number of measures to handle the increase,68 but the backlog in applications
continues to grow.69

57
See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the business method exception was poorly defined and unnecessary and that cases supporting the business
method exception were actually decided on other grounds, such as novelty or nonobviousness).
58
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
59
Id. at 1545.
60
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
61
Id. at 1373.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1375.
64
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
65
Id. at 1358.
66
Lytle and Dellinger, supra note 2.
67
Id.
68
See generally United States Patent and Trademark Office, A USPTO White Paper: Automated
Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf.
69
Dennis Crouch, Updated Business Method Patent Statistics, PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/05/updated_busines.html (last visited April 25, 2006).
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IV.

JAPAN ALSO HAS STRUGGLED TO FIND THE RIGHT STANDARD FOR
SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

Japan has taken a different path in dealing with the challenges
presented by software and business method patents. Japan is one of the most
important countries in the world patent system, with nineteen percent of
patents in force in 2003;70 therefore, its system offers lessons that are
applicable to the United States as well.
Under the Japanese system, the general rules for patentability apply to
all inventions, including software.71 In addition, software inventions are
subject to special treatment under a second set of rules that specifically
address computer-related inventions.72
A.

Japanese Patent Law Requires That All Patentable Inventions Apply a
Law of Nature and Be Applicable to Industrial Use

The Japanese standard for patentable subject matter has a shorter and
somewhat less tempestuous history than the U.S. standard. Unlike the
relaxed U.S. standard, the Japanese standard is stricter and more complex.
Japanese patent law defines an invention as “the highly advanced
creation of technical ideas by which a law of nature is utilized.”73 In this
context, the word “highly” is not used for determining patentability but is
used only to distinguish patents from utility models, which provide a lower
level of protection for an invention.74 Therefore, the key requirement for a
device or process to be considered a patentable invention is that it must be a
creation of technical ideas that uses a law of nature.
The word “nature,” in the Japanese patent law, is used in the same
sense as “natural science.”75 Discovery of a law of nature is not sufficient –
in order to be a patentable invention, the invention must apply a law of
nature to solve a particular problem.76 Some inventions that have been
denied patents on this basis include an advertising method and a method for
making a telegraphic code combining Roman letters, figures and signs.77
70
In 2003, 49% of patents in force were in the United States or Japan. TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION,
TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 2004 EDITION 5, available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2004/
tsr2004.pdf.
71
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part VII, Chapter 1, at 2.
72
Id.
73
Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2.
74
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1.
75
KITAGAWA, supra note 30, § 2.01[1].
76
Id. § 2.01[3].
77
Id. § 2.01[1].
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The Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) examination guidelines list a number of
categories of invention that are unpatentable for not meeting this
requirement.78 Most importantly, they exclude patentability for inventions
that use laws other than laws of nature, such as economic laws or arbitrary
arrangements.79 The guidelines exclude computer programming languages
and pure business methods from patentability on this basis.80
In addition to the base requirement defined above, the invention must
be capable of industrial use.81 The JPO examination guidelines note that
“‘[i]ndustry’ is interpreted in a broad sense, including mining, agriculture,
fishery, transportation, telecommunications, etc., as well as
manufacturing.”82 The examination guidelines enumerate a set of inventions
that are considered industrially inapplicable, such as medical procedures
performed on humans.83 Also included are commercially inapplicable
inventions, such as methods with purely personal uses (e.g. a method for
smoking) and inventions applied only for scientific or experimental
purposes.84
B.

The JPO Provides Special Treatment for Computer-Related Inventions

Rather than use a one-size-fits-all approach, the JPO sets special
guidelines for determining patentability of software inventions. These
special requirements ensure that software inventions meet the base
requirement that a patentable invention must “utiliz[e] a law of nature.”85 A
business method implemented in software may be patentable if the invention
meets these requirements.86
The JPO made an early attempt to define standards for patentability of
software with examination guidelines issued in 1975.87 The guidelines
stated that software was only patentable when it was incorporated into an
apparatus or system.88 An example of this requirement is using software to
control the operation of an industrial process in a mill.89 The JPO set this
requirement to ensure that software inventions would meet the “law of
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-3.
See id., Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-2.
See id., Part II, Chapter 1, at 2.
Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 4.
Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 4.
Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 7.
Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 11.
Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 2-3.
Furutani, supra note 8, at 2-3.
KITAGAWA, supra note 30, § 2.01[7].
Id.
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nature” requirement of the patent law.90 Under the 1975 standards, computer
languages were specifically declared unpatentable, because they were just
symbolic codes.91 Also considered unpatentable were programs for
processing data, because they were "regarded as merely methods for
displaying or reporting social or natural phenomena by an assembly of
numerals or symbols."92 The JPO applied these standards in 1980 to deny a
patent on a method for classifying data using a computer, because the
invention was related to a mathematical operation rather than control of a
computer.93
In 1993, the JPO issued a new version of the examination guidelines
that relaxed the standard.94 The new guidelines allowed patentability for
computer programs that handled non-technical operations, such as word
processing, if the programs were carried out using hardware resources on the
computer.95 The JPO also eliminated the “Point of Novelty Approach,”
under which the patent office evaluated the patentability of an invention
based only on the novel part of the invention.96 Instead, patentability was to
be determined based on the whole invention.97
In 2000, the JPO issued its latest version of the Examination
Guidelines, which remains in effect.98 The JPO’s goal for the latest version
was to update its guidelines to better handle business method patents.99 The
changes focused on the standards for determining whether inventions meet
the inventive step requirement.100
Under the current examination guidelines for software-related patents,
inventors may claim both methods and products. 101 A method claim defines
the invention by a series of operations in a time series. 102 A product claim
defines the invention in terms of the functions performed by the software.103
In addition, all claims must clearly show that a computer is performing the
90

Id.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Furutani, supra note 8, at 3.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 3-4.
99
TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2001 10, available at
http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2001/tsr_2001.pdf.
100
SHINJIRO ONO, SUBSTANTIVE PATENT HARMONIZATION AND JAPAN’S STANCE 4,
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number8/CM%20-%20Ono.pdf (last visited May 11,
2006).
101
JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part VII, Chapter 1, at 3.
102
Id.
103
Id.
91

JANUARY 2007

BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS

207

actions described.104 According to the JPO, failing to do so may make the
claims invalid because they do not meet the requirement that the “invention
. . . must be clearly stated.”105 For example, an inventor cannot simply claim
“[a]n order-receiving method using a computer, comprising the steps
of . . . ”, because the claim would be unclear as to whether the steps were to
be carried out by a computer or by a human using the computer for
assistance.106
Although the examination guidelines have a special section for
computer-related inventions, not every invention that uses software is
required to be evaluated using that section.107 For instance, if the application
claims subject matter that is specifically non-statutory, such as an invention
that applies economic laws only or that is mere presentation of data, the
invention is not patentable.108 In contrast, some inventions clearly make use
of a law of nature, without any need to consider the special rules.109 These
inventions can simply be evaluated under the general examination
guidelines.110 If the invention uses a computer to control an apparatus, such
as a rice cooker, it should be evaluated under the general requirements for
industrial inventions.111 Similarly, if the invention is a computer that works
based on physical properties of an object, such as the rotation rate of an
engine, it should be evaluated under the general requirements.112
If the invention cannot be evaluated under the general requirements, it
will be evaluated under the software-specific standards. These requirements
ensure that the claimed software invention uses a law of nature.113 To be
patentable, a software invention must claim “information processing by
software [that] is concretely realized by using hardware resources.”114 That
is, the claims must describe how the computer reads the software and uses
the software in combination with the computer hardware to perform
arithmetic or information manipulation.115 Even if the specification
104

Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 5.
Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 4 (quoting Japanese Patent Law, Section 36(6)(ii)).
106
Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 4-5.
107
See id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 12-13.
108
Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 13.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 11.
114
Id.
115
Id. As an example, under this standard the JPO allowed a version of Citibank’s electronic cash
patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,455,407 (filed January 27, 1995). The following claim met the JPO requirements
and was allowed in Japan Patent No. 3604151:
105
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describes a patentable system, the system will not be patentable unless the
claims describe hardware and software working together.116 This is distinct
from the U.S. standard, which does not require any reference to hardware.117
The JPO has struggled with the same set of issues as the USPTO in
determining how to deal with software and business method patents. Unlike
the United States, Japan has not abandoned subject matter as a restriction on
patentability. Instead, Japan has developed a specialized set of rules to
ensure that software inventions meet the general requirement that patentable
inventions must use a law of nature. In addition, the JPO has carved out a
group of software patents that do not require special treatment. In doing so,
the JPO has attempted to find a balance between allowing patents in a broad
area of technology and maintaining reasonable restrictions on the types of
allowable patents.
V.

THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM SHOULD ADOPT A STANDARD THAT ALLOWS
PATENTS FOR USEFUL SOFTWARE INVENTIONS BUT LIMITS PATENTS ON
BUSINESS METHODS

The standard for determining what is patentable subject matter should
first ensure that the patent rights granted are sufficient to encourage the
development of new fields of technology. This should be balanced against
the need to ensure that there are sufficient limits on the monopoly rights
being granted to new technology. Because the categories of software patents
and business method patents are closely related, any standard that affects
one will tend to affect the other. The United States should adopt a new
standard that balances the need to encourage innovation in software with the
equally important need to limit patents on inventions that are purely methods
of doing business.
A system for transferring electric notes between electronic modules, comprising:
electronic modules, each of which has a processor and memory therein, wherein the electronic
modules are capable of establishing an cryptographically secure channel and transferring and
receiving the electronic notes through the cryptographically secure channel, and memorizing the
electronic notes into the memory;
wherein the memorized electronic notes comprises
a body group of data fields which include data indicative of monetary value associated with the
electronic note; and
a transfer group of data fields that include a transfer record list, wherein each of transfer record list
includes a sequence number that distinguishes the transferred electronic note generated by a transferor
electronic module from one or more of the other transferred electronic note that have been transferred
from a common electronic module of transfer source and have been made from a common electronic
note.
116
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117
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Software Inventions Should Be Patentable Because They Serve Useful
Economic Purposes

In many industries, functions that would have been implemented in
hardware in the past are now implemented in software. The Supreme Court
recognized this practice in Diamond v. Diehr,118 when it held that a
manufacturing process did not become unpatentable simply because a
general-purpose computer was involved in one step.119 Most modern
software patents are for similar inventions that merely shift functionality
from hardware to software. The vast majority of software patents are
acquired by companies in industries other than the software industry.120 A
recent study found that manufacturing companies in the United States
received seventy-five percent of software patents, compared to thirteen
percent for companies in software publishing and services.121 Patents from
manufacturing companies tend to be for manufacturing processes, so there is
little risk that the companies will attempt to claim abstract ideas.
Software patents are useful within the software industry as well.
Recent history suggests that the software industry can benefit from the
incentives provided by patents. For many years, economists wondered why
businesses’ increased use of computers and information technology did not
result in faster productivity growth.122 For the two decades prior to 1995,
productivity growth in the United States averaged only 1.5% a year, despite
efficiency improvements expected from increased computerization of the
workplace. 123 However, since 1995, productivity growth has doubled to
three percent per year and remained high even as the country went through a
recession and slow economic recovery.124 Some economists have suggested
that the increase came as businesses adapted to take advantage of the new
technology.125
This adaptation to new technology suggests that there may be some
benefit to allowing patents on software to encourage further development in
the area. It is possible that the key to increased productivity was not the
introduction of computers into the workplace, but the introduction of useful
new applications that allow businesses to better make use of those
118
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computers.126
Allowing patents on nonobvious but incremental
improvements in business software might be the incentive that is needed to
encourage businesses to take advantage of the technology.
More concretely, software patents provide a boost to many software
startups, which produce some of the most important innovations in the
software industry.127 A recent survey of venture capitalists and executives
from software startups found that patents can be very useful to startups that
have begun marketing their products.128 The survey found that patents do
not provide much advantage to pre-revenue startups because of the costs of
enforcing a patent and because the company does not yet have a product to
protect.129 However, the same survey also found that a patent can help a
company in the early days of selling its product by allowing continued
innovation free from competition.130 A patent can also encourage larger
companies to acquire the startup by providing information about the
startup’s innovations.131
These benefits sufficiently justify allowing software patents.
However, such justifications should not extend so far as to cover business
method patents as well.
B.

The Costs of Business Method Patents Outweigh the Benefits

One major concern with business method patents is that they are often
of lower quality, meaning that they should have been denied patentability
based on novelty or nonobviousness. In particular, there are many patents
that have been awarded on relatively mundane business inventions.132 For
instance, inventions such as online shopping carts, 133 online credit card
payments,134 and online affiliate programs135 have received patents that some
advocacy groups argue should have been denied as obvious or lacking
novelty. 136 Under State Street, business method patents are supposed to be
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held to the same requirements as other types of patents,137 but they pose
special challenges that make them harder for examiners to reject.138 A
particular problem is that patent examiners rarely cite non-patent prior art.139
This makes business method patents more likely to be granted, because the
field lacks prior art patents.140 Many well-known business methods are
poorly documented for use in a patent search, because they are implemented
in policies and practices that are not easily accessible to a patent examiner.141
In addition, prior to State Street, businesses that invented new business
methods were more likely to protect them using trade secret law.142 As such,
an examiner would not be able to find information about these secret
business methods to use as prior art when examining new applications.143
In infringement trials, these poor-quality patents should be found
invalid, because the defendants have a much greater incentive to bring
forward invalidating prior art. However, in some cases the subjective
element of the evaluation will unfairly influence the judge’s decision.144
Judges are more likely to find inventions patentable in poorly-known or
poorly-understood fields.145 This tendency may favor certain hard-tounderstand types of business method patents.146
Even if these low-quality patents are eventually invalidated by a court,
they can still cause damage. The possibility of an injunction if they lose a
lawsuit leads many accused infringers to settle rather than risk a trial.147
Accused infringers often prefer to avoid the costs of litigation and choose to
settle, even if the patent being asserted is likely to be invalid.148 In addition,
even if the patent is eventually found invalid, it can have major effects on
the market because the patent owner is able to gain advantages that do not
137
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disappear after invalidation.149 The time during which the patentee received
erroneous patent protection might be enough to gain customer loyalty
sufficient to maintain its advantage afterwards.150
The litigation between Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble over
Amazon’s 1-click patent151 provides a concrete example of these problems.
Amazon.com received a patent in 1999 on a system that allowed customers
to buy items without having to re-enter their shipping and billing data and
quickly sued Barnes & Noble, who had a similar system on their site, for
patent infringement.152 Many groups believed the patent to be invalid, but
Barnes & Noble settled after two years rather than incur the expense of
continued litigation.153 This demonstrates how companies prefer to settle
rather than to fight a potentially invalid patent at trial. To understand the
advantages that an invalid patent may provide, imagine that Amazon’s patent
had been found invalid after several years of litigation. By this time,
Amazon’s customers would have become accustomed to the convenience of
shopping at Amazon compared to other online retailers. Even though other
retailers would now be able to provide the same convenience, many
customers would stay with the website with which they were familiar. In
this way, the “stickiness” of a service like 1-click could provide advantages
even if the patent were eventually found invalid.154
An additional objection to business method patents is that they may be
unnecessary. The patent system is intended to provide an incentive for
invention and public propagation of such inventions.155 Therefore, before
patent protection is extended to a new field, there should be some
consideration of whether that protection is necessary to achieve those goals.
The key question is whether the incentive provided by the patent monopoly
is large enough to balance the loss to the economy from the monopoly.156
The process of evaluating the value of business method patents is
made more difficult by the fact that some people, generally patent holders,
believe that any idea or concept that has value should be protected by the
law.157 However, the U.S. legal system has never gone that far. The Framers
149
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of the Constitution rejected the “just deserts”158 approach, the idea that the
patent is a reward for invention, in favor of the result-oriented statement that
Congress could create a patent system to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts . . . .”159 Therefore, the decision on whether to allow a class
of patents should be based on a balancing of costs and benefits.
Of course, there is an argument in favor of allowing business method
patents—that is, providing protection for business method inventions
encourages innovation in business methods just as it would any other area.160
In general, the legal system recognizes a property right when it is necessary
to prevent a tragedy of the commons, i.e. to prevent free-riders.161 The
argument, then, is that if business methods are patentable, businesses will
have an incentive to develop new methods in order to get their own
protection and to work around those methods already patented by
competitors.162
However, this argument does not justify allowing business method
patents because the same incentive is already built into the free market
system.163 Companies must develop more efficient or more effective
methods of doing business in order to succeed against their competitors.164
In fact, an effective business method can be its own reward.165 Sticky
business methods that bring customer loyalty or network effects will bring
competitive advantage to the company that invents those methods, even
without patent protection.166 As Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss of New York
University said, “With lock in, network effects, and even good old fashioned
loyalty, lead time (the first mover advantage) goes a long way to assuring
returns adequate to recoup costs and earn substantial profit.”167 While
innovation in business methods is a good thing, it is likely that there would
be the same level of innovation even without patents on them.
Not only does the free market system make business method patents
unnecessary, such patents can actually be damaging to the free market
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system.168 The system works based on the idea that companies are
competing on a level playing field, so that the best and most efficient
company will win.169 Just like in a sporting event, the rules should be equal
for both sides.170 By giving a patent monopoly on particular business
practices, the government distorts the operation of the free market system
and reduces the gains from the operation of the market.171 In the free market
system, players should succeed in the free market based on superior skill and
implementation.
A particular problem in the United States is that business method
patents do not have to be technological. This is inconsistent with the
Constitution and with Supreme Court precedent. The Framers did not intend
“useful arts” to mean every created thing.172 At the time, the term “useful
arts” was commonly used in contrast to the ideas of the “liberal arts” and the
“fine arts,” which were well-known ideas in the eighteenth century.173 In In
re Bergy,174 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor court
to the Federal Circuit, described a technological requirement when it noted
that “the present day equivalent of the term ‘useful arts’ employed by the
Founding Fathers is ‘technological arts.’”175
The Supreme Court also laid out a similar requirement in Benson and
Diehr. In setting the standards for patenting software, the Court in Benson
and Diehr cited Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. to support the
holding that patentable subject matter must result “from the application of
the law of nature to produce a new and useful end.”176 One definition of
technology is simply that it is applied science.177 Since science is an attempt
to understand the laws of nature, the Court’s holdings in Benson and Diehr
are really stating a requirement that inventions must be technological.178
However, when the Federal Circuit eliminated the business method
exception in State Street, they restated the standard for patentable subject
matter as simply something that produces a “useful, concrete and tangible
168
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result.” In the process, the court eliminated the Supreme Court’s
requirement that patentable inventions must also be “applications of the law
of nature.”
A recent case before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(“BPAI”), Ex parte Lundgren,179 demonstrates this lack of a technology
requirement. The patent at issue in Lundgren claimed a method for
determining the compensation of managers in industries that are susceptible
to collusion.180 Unlike common practice for business method patents, the
Lundgren application did not describe the use of a computer as part of the
implementation.181 The examiner rejected the application as “nothing more
than an abstract idea which is not associated or connected to any
technological art.”182 The BPAI overruled the rejection, holding that there
was no separate requirement that patents must be in the “technological arts”
in order to be patentable subject matter.183 In so doing, the BPAI showed
that the current standard for patentable subject matter has left behind the
constitutional requirement that patents arise from the “useful arts” and be an
“application of the law of nature.”
Finally, the fundamental problem with business method patents is the
difficulty of differentiating between processes that are principles and those
that are patentable applications.184 The challenge is to keep people from
patenting laws of nature or abstract concepts.185 The Freeman-Walter-Abele
test tried to solve this by ensuring that software inventions must show a
connection to a physical implementation in order to receive a patent.186
When the Federal Circuit swept away that requirement in State Street, it
became much easier to patent abstract concepts. The United States should
move towards a standard that would limit this danger.
VI.

INCORPORATING THE JAPANESE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE INVENTIONS WOULD BETTER ENABLE
THE UNITED STATES TO GRANT PATENTS FOR SOFTWARE INVENTIONS
WHILE DENYING PATENTS TO BUSINESS METHODS

There are a number of problems with business method patents in the
United States. The challenge is to construct a standard for patentability in
179
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this area that restricts the patenting of business methods but does not exclude
patenting desirable software inventions. At the same time, a new standard
for patentable subject matter should reinstate the “law of nature”
requirement that the Federal Circuit failed to retain in State Street.187 The
United States should accomplish this by combining the standards of the
Japanese and U.S. systems.
The proposed standard would have two overarching requirements.
First, it would require that a patentable invention must be a technical idea
implementing a law of nature. Second, it would modify the utility
requirement by combining the U.S. requirement of utility with the parallel
Japanese requirement of industrial applicability.
To ensure that inventions meet the requirement of implementing a law
of nature, the proposed standard would use the elaboration provided by
Japanese law. First, inventions that use software to control an apparatus or
that work by processing data about an object will always be considered
statutory and should be evaluated based on the other patentability
requirements, such as novelty and nonobviousness.188 Under Japanese law,
some classes of software inventions are not subject to special treatment for
determining whether they meet the law of nature requirement.189 Patents to
inventions that use software to control an apparatus or that work based on
physical properties of an object are considered statutory and are treated as
regular industrial inventions, rather than as software patents.190 The
proposed standard would retain this exclusion. This would be consistent
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Diehr, since the invention found
patentable in that case used software to control a manufacturing process.191
If the invention is not considered an application of a law of nature
based on the first test, it can meet the requirement by showing “information
processing by software . . . concretely realized by using hardware
resources.”192 Under the Japanese standard, the claims must specifically
show how the invention uses software to control hardware to achieve a
useful result.193 The proposed standard would use this requirement as a
second stage to ensure that software inventions meet the requirement of
implementing a law of nature.
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Under the proposed standard, software inventions would still be held
to a utility requirement. In addition to the U.S. requirement that an
invention constitutes patentable subject matter if it is used to create a
“useful, concrete and tangible result,” 194 software inventions would have to
be applicable to industrial use as defined under Japanese law. These
requirements are similar but have been applied slightly differently. 195 Under
the proposed standard, software inventions would have to meet both versions
of the requirement. This new requirement would include the JPO’s list of
inventions that are specifically excluded from patenting because they are by
definition not industrial. 196 The combination of the technical idea and
industrial use requirements limits patentability by excluding certain
inventions such as those with purely personal use and those that do not make
use of laws of nature.197
A.

The Proposed Standard Provides Reasonable Limitations on Business
Method Patents

The proposed standard offers an effective way to re-impose a
technology requirement on patentable subject matter. First, it would
explicitly restore the requirement that inventions must apply a law of nature
in order to be patentable. However, this alone is inadequate because of the
difficulty in applying such a requirement. Although a technological
requirement would be useful and consistent with the historical understanding
of the patent system, it is very difficult to come up with a legally useful
definition of technology.198 This is particularly a challenge with software
inventions, since the functioning of software often does not directly depend
on laws of nature.199
The Japanese elaboration on the law of nature requirement provides a
useful mechanism for dealing with this challenge. To do so, it provides rules
for determining if an invention is technological that are explicit and
relatively easy to apply. At the first stage, an examiner merely has to
194
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determine whether the software portion of the invention is interacting with
physical devices or physical data,200 both of which can be determined easily
from the claims. If there is no clear interaction with the physical, the claims
can meet the requirements by directly describing the interaction between
hardware and software.201 Thus, the standard gives clear guidance to
examiners. In the same way, it gives clear guidance to applicants so that
they know what they have to do to ensure that their invention meets the law
of nature requirement.
A particular advantage of adopting the Japanese standard is that, as an
existing standard, it has already been tested. The Japanese standard has been
applied to deny some of the most controversial business method patents.
The JPO denied patents to several famous business methods that were
allowed in the United States, such as Priceline.com’s reverse auction
invention202 and the Japanese version of the patent that was at issue in State
Street.
In addition, the requirement that inventions be industrially applicable
would enforce a form of technological requirement. One proposed
definition is that technology is “knowledge that is applied toward material
enterprise, guided by an orientation to the external environment and the
necessity of design.”203 The Japanese requirement of industrial applicability
is very similar to this definition, particularly with its emphasis on interaction
with the physical environment.204 This is also consistent with an intuitive
understanding of what technology means. Thus, this requirement would pull
the patent law back towards a minimum technology requirement. By
incorporating the requirement that the invention produce a “useful, concrete
and tangible result,” the new standard would maintain the existing U.S.
requirement.
The proposed standard would also help to improve the quality of
business method patents. In part, it would do this by forcing all business
method patents to be claimed as software patents. Currently, an examiner
searching for prior art on a business method patent has limited options for
finding prior art. Since historically companies have preferred to keep
business methods as trade secrets,205 examiners have difficulty finding
relevant prior art, even for well-known ideas. Applying the proposed
200
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standard shifts those patents into the field of software, where there is
significantly more prior art.
Not only would confining business method patents to their software
and hardware implementations make the prior art search easier, it would also
limit their applicability to those implementations. The proposed standard
limits the scope of the patent to the particular implementation in hardware
and software. In so doing, it limits the scope of the patent monopoly and
gives competitors more opportunities to design around those limitations.
Also, by making it easier to deny patentability based on subject matter, the
standard reduces the chances that bad patents will make it through
prosecution and later be found invalid in court.
B.

At the Same Time, the Proposed Standard Maintains the Benefits of
Software Patents

Any proposed change in standards for patentability of business
methods should rein in the negative elements of business method patents
while maintaining the benefits of software patents. The combined standard
proposed here succeeds in doing this by bringing only a few restrictions to
software patents as a side effect of putting stronger restrictions on business
method patents.
The proposed standard would not affect the decision of the PTO for
most software patents, because it short-circuits the evaluation for inventions
that use software to control an apparatus or that process data about an object.
Manufacturing companies receive the majority of software patents.206 Even
in the software industry itself, companies in areas such as graphics and
image processing are more likely to obtain patents than companies
developing internet software or financial software.207 Inventions patented by
manufacturing companies generally use software to control manufacturing
processes, so those inventions would automatically be considered patentable
subject matter under the proposed standard. Similarly, inventions in the
areas of graphics and image processing use physical properties of an object,
either for input data or for output, so those inventions would automatically
be considered patentable.
In effect, the first part of the law of nature requirement means that the
other new restrictions on software patents do not apply to the majority of
inventions where patentability is uncontroversial. For example, inventions
that use software to control devices have been patentable since Diehr and are
206
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rarely considered when commentators discuss software patents. More
importantly, inventions that use software to control physical objects or that
work based on physical properties of the invention are bound in the physical
world and cannot be considered business methods. Instead, they use
software to assist real-world activities that are already considered patentable.
Looked at another way, these inventions use software to perform the exact
function that would have been done in hardware in the past. An explicit rule
on this subject adds certainty in an area that is not particularly controversial,
while applying an additional set of principles to a more difficult question.
A minority of inventions will still be affected by the restrictions, but
the limitations are not unreasonable. Software inventors would probably
prefer not to have to incorporate hardware into their patent claims. Software
engineers tend to design in terms of layers of abstraction so that they can
develop programs for an operating system without having to consider the
hardware underneath.208 The proposed standard would require them to break
through these layers of abstraction in order to write their claims. In addition,
incorporating hardware elements into software claims limits the scope of
those claims, which could limit inventors’ ability to claim infringement at
some later time.
However, engineers will still be able to write their claims in such a
way that they incorporate software interacting with hardware. That is, in the
context of software patents, the rule just requires that patent drafters rethink
their view of the invention. It does not require that the drafters rethink the
invention.
VII. THE PROPOSED STANDARD WOULD ASSIST EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE
PATENT LAWS WORLDWIDE
Moving the United States toward the Japanese standard for patenting
software would also benefit efforts to harmonize international patent laws.
The inherent benefits of harmonization, including lower costs for inventors
and patent offices, are an additional incentive for the United States to adopt
the Japanese standard.
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Progress Toward Patent Law Harmonization Has Sped Up in Recent
Years

Efforts towards patent law harmonization have been fitful in the past,
with little progress towards actual harmonization until recent years. Most
harmonization negotiations have set minimum levels of protection for
patents or have harmonized procedural aspects of patent law. However, in
the past decade, countries have made more progress in harmonizing
substantive patent law.
Prior to the 1990s, patent treaties focused on setting minimum
requirements for patent protection and simplifying procedural formalities.
The Paris Convention, which went into effect in 1884,209 set base standards
for the patent systems of all signatory countries, including requiring that
signatory countries provide the same rights to nationals of other signatory
countries as they provide to their own nationals.210 The Patent Cooperation
Treaty, which went into effect in 1978,211 supplemented this by simplifying
procedural aspects for filing patent applications in multiple countries.212 In
1994, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) imposed new substantive
requirements.213 In particular, it required that all member countries grant
patents to “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application.”214
The most recent effort on patent law harmonization is the Patent Law
Treaty (“PLT”). PLT negotiations began in the 1980s as an attempt to
harmonize patent law worldwide, but in the early 1990s the United States
decided against further participation.215 The U.S. withdrawal stopped
progress on the treaty.216 Despite its withdrawal from the process, the
United States continued to move its system towards harmonization with the
rest of the world.217 First, it continued to work on other patent-related
209
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treaties, such as TRIPS.218 It eventually continued negotiations on
harmonizing the formality and procedural requirements for patent
applications, which led to a more limited version of the PLT that went into
effect in 2000.219 Second, the United States unilaterally changed a number
of aspects of its law that were out-of-step with the rest of the world.220
These changes eliminated many U.S.-only aspects of the law.221 For
example, the new law provided for publication of applications eighteen
months after filing222 and allowed inventors to file provisional
applications.223 The process is continuing, as Congress is currently
considering a new patent reform law224 that will make additional changes to
bring U.S. practice in line with the rest of the world, most importantly
shifting U.S. law to a first-to-file system for determining priority of
invention.225
Since agreeing on procedural harmonization through the PLT,
negotiators have continued work on substantive harmonization with the
Substantive Patent Law Treaty.226 The negotiations have covered elements
of substantive patent law such as definitions of prior art227 and the
enablement requirement.228 In the earlier stages of the negotiations, the
treaty did not include a technology requirement in its standard for patentable
subject matter.229 In later sessions, the parties have discussed whether to add
a requirement that patentable inventions must be “in all fields of
technology,”230 or whether to leave out that limitation.231 In 2002, the
218
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negotiators agreed to postpone further consideration of the question,232
which is where negotiations currently stand.233
B.

Patent Law Harmonization Brings Significant Benefits to All
Stakeholders in the Patent System

The benefits of harmonization significantly outweigh its costs. The
most significant cost of harmonization is that it eliminates some of the
experimentation that comes from having different standards in different
countries. Just as federalism allows U.S. states to experiment with laws to
best fit local conditions, so the diversity of patent laws throughout the world
may allow countries to tailor their laws to fit local needs. For instance,
countries like the United States or Japan, which depend on technology for
economic growth, can create strong patents to encourage inventors to
advance the state of the art. In contrast, developing countries, which need to
adapt to existing technology, may find that their needs are better served by
weaker protection.
On the other hand, this loss is heavily outweighed by the benefits of
harmonization to inventors and to national patent systems. The most
obvious benefit is that harmonization can reduce costs to the applicants.234
The benefit of substantive patent law harmonization is that applicants will
have to do less tailoring to prepare their applications for filing in different
countries. Although there will still be the costs associated with translations
and the like, harmonization allows applicants to avoid having to significantly
change claims and descriptions in each application. In this respect,
substantive patent law harmonization is similar to the PCT, which reduced
costs for applicants by allowing them to file a single application to claim
priority in multiple countries.235
Harmonization also brings cost savings to the national patent
offices.236 There is a significant shortage of qualified patent examiners
worldwide. National patent offices are continually forced to add significant
numbers of new examiners.237 At the same time, the number of patent
232
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applications filed has grown significantly in recent years.238 In many
countries, this increase in applications has stemmed from foreign applicants,
as the number of domestic applications has stayed relatively level.239
Harmonization can help simplify the task of the patent examiners by
allowing examiners in different national offices to work together to reduce
the costs of searching for prior art.240 A more primitive version of such
cooperative effort already exists, in the form of the international search
provided by PCT applications. However, greater harmonization would
enable national offices to cooperate even more closely. Ultimately, the goal
would be for the patent laws to be harmonized to the point that offices would
be able to recognize examination results from other offices.241
Harmonization can also mitigate the problem of companies that freeride on patented inventions in countries where those inventions are not
patented.242 The concern here is the same one that underlies the patent
system. National patent systems were created to protect companies that
invest in developing new technologies.243 A patent on a new technology
ensures that the innovating company can capitalize on its invention by
preventing competitors from immediately copying the invention and driving
the price down. 244 If a company doubts that it will be able to get a return on
its investment, it will likely choose not to make the investment at all.245
Similarly, when some countries have lower levels of patent protection than
others, companies in countries with higher levels of protection will be less
likely to invest in an invention because they know that the invention will
immediately be copied in countries with a lower level of protection.246 Thus,
the citizens of the country with the lower level of protection benefit at the
expense of the citizens with the higher level of protection. Substantive
harmonization creates minimum standards and helps avoid this type of freeriding.
238
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The Proposed Standard Would Improve the Chances of Harmonizing
the Law for Software Patents

The WIPO group working on the Substantive Patent Law Treaty has
reached an impasse on the question of patentable subject matter.247 This
stems in large part from the significant differences in standards for business
method patents between the United States and other countries, such as
Japan.248
The United States could improve the prospects for agreement on
harmonization through unilateral action. The United States significantly
changed its patent law between the breakdown of PLT negotiations in 1993
and the resumption of negotiations in 2000.249 Changes such as the eighteen
month publication requirement and the introduction of the provisional
application reduced the differences between U.S. and foreign patent laws
and made it easier for the parties to reach compromises to agree on the
PLT.250 In fact, that process is continuing, since the latest patent reform
efforts will bring the United States even closer to international standards by
switching the U.S. system to a first-to-file system and by eliminating the
best mode requirement, which is another U.S.-only requirement.251
In a similar way, adopting the Japanese standard for patentable subject
matter would reduce the differences that treaty negotiators would have to
confront in order to reach an agreement on substantive patent law
harmonization. The U.S. standard is much looser than the Japanese
standard. It is even more generous when compared to the European
standard, which specifically excludes patents on “programs for
computers.”252 Developing nations also tend to support some form of
technology requirement.253 Since the United States is the outlier, it should
be the first to make the change, in order to support the goal of
harmonization. Of course, even if the United States adopts the Japanese
standard, there will still be significant differences. However, if two of the
247
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three main patent regimes, i.e. the United States and Japan, had the same
standard in this area, they could build sufficient momentum to push
negotiations forward. In addition, such a concession by the United States in
this area would help to encourage progress in other areas of harmonization
negotiations.
By adopting the Japanese standard for patenting software and business
methods, the United States could help further substantive patent law
harmonization. Thus, the advantages for harmonization are another
significant reason to adopt the standard.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since State Street, the U.S. courts have set too broad a standard for
patenting business methods. The current standard allows useful software
patents, but also allows too many patents on pure business methods. These
business method patents tend to be of lower quality and are unnecessary to
achieve the goal of encouraging innovation in business. In addition,
business method patents are inconsistent with the basic understanding that
patents should be granted for inventions that are technological. The United
States should limit these business method patents by merging its standard for
patenting business methods with the Japanese standard. This would limit
business method patents while still allowing useful software patents. It
would also encourage patent law harmonization by narrowing the
differences between the major negotiating countries.

